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But the assumption that illusions of meaning are ppossible has not, the author believes, been seriously examined; nor has the problem of how such illusions could be diagnosed been satisfactorily answered.
This book critically examines what little has been done to explain how illusions of meaning might be possible and illustrates the problem of diagnosis with a discussion of the work of Norman Malcolm on dreaming. In the author's view, Malcolm's verificationism leads him into various errors, such as that of treating nonsense as if it had a 'sense that is senseless' and could enter into logical relationships.
Similar problems face all who attempt to use 'nonsense', 'senselessness', unintelligibility', and 'meaninglessness' as terms of philosophical criticism - philosophers such as Ludwig Wittgenstein (both early and late), Bertrand Russell, Gilbert Ryle, P.T. Geach, P.M.S. Hacker and of course logical positivists like Rudolf Carnap and A.J. Ayer.
The book extends the work of a number of recent writers on Wittgenstein (especially Cora Diamond and Edward Witherspoon) who have advocated an 'austere' view of nonsense, but in a more sceptical direction that they have taken.
It argues that nonsensicalism (the theory and practice of accusing your opponents of talking nonsense) is radically misguided and should be abandoned.
The possibility that illusions of meaning occur outside philosophy - in dreams, in certain hoaxes, in madness, or under the influence of drugs - is also examined.
About the Author:
Ian Dearden read philosophy at Downing College, Cambridge, and Bedford College, London. He has taught philosophy at Bedford College, the City University, the Polytechnic of North London and the University of Essex, and also for the London Universituy Department of Extra-Mural Studies.
This book critically examines what little has been done to explain how illusions of meaning might be possible and illustrates the problem of diagnosis with a discussion of the work of Norman Malcolm on dreaming. In the author's view, Malcolm's verificationism leads him into various errors, such as that of treating nonsense as if it had a 'sense that is senseless' and could enter into logical relationships.
Similar problems face all who attempt to use 'nonsense', 'senselessness', unintelligibility', and 'meaninglessness' as terms of philosophical criticism - philosophers such as Ludwig Wittgenstein (both early and late), Bertrand Russell, Gilbert Ryle, P.T. Geach, P.M.S. Hacker and of course logical positivists like Rudolf Carnap and A.J. Ayer.
The book extends the work of a number of recent writers on Wittgenstein (especially Cora Diamond and Edward Witherspoon) who have advocated an 'austere' view of nonsense, but in a more sceptical direction that they have taken.
It argues that nonsensicalism (the theory and practice of accusing your opponents of talking nonsense) is radically misguided and should be abandoned.
The possibility that illusions of meaning occur outside philosophy - in dreams, in certain hoaxes, in madness, or under the influence of drugs - is also examined.
About the Author:
Ian Dearden read philosophy at Downing College, Cambridge, and Bedford College, London. He has taught philosophy at Bedford College, the City University, the Polytechnic of North London and the University of Essex, and also for the London Universituy Department of Extra-Mural Studies.